<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article
PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.4 20190208//EN"
       "JATS-journalpublishing1.dtd">
<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.4" xml:lang="en">
 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">Economic and Social Research</journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title xml:lang="en">Economic and Social Research</journal-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Экономические и социально-гуманитарные исследования</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn publication-format="print">2409-1073</issn>
   <issn publication-format="online">3033-5442</issn>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">123946</article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24151/2409-1073-2023-1-60-66</article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="edn">PFXPQT</article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="ru">
     <subject>Экономика инновационного развития: теория и практика</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="en">
     <subject>Economics of Innovation-Driven Growth: Theory and Practice</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group>
     <subject>Экономика инновационного развития: теория и практика</subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    <article-title xml:lang="en">Principal-agent problem in corporate governance: essence, causes, main approaches to resolution</article-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Агентская проблема в корпоративном управлении: сущность, причины, основные подходы к разрешению</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </title-group>
   <contrib-group content-type="authors">
    <contrib contrib-type="author">
     <name-alternatives>
      <name xml:lang="ru">
       <surname>Костенко</surname>
       <given-names>Николай Николаевич</given-names>
      </name>
      <name xml:lang="en">
       <surname>Kostenko</surname>
       <given-names>Nikolay N.</given-names>
      </name>
     </name-alternatives>
     <email>pyrkoviv@mail.ru</email>
     <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group>
   <aff-alternatives id="aff-1">
    <aff>
     <institution xml:lang="ru">Самарский государственный экономический университет</institution>
    </aff>
    <aff>
     <institution xml:lang="en">Samara State University of Economics</institution>
    </aff>
   </aff-alternatives>
   <pub-date publication-format="print" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2023-04-13T00:00:00+03:00">
    <day>13</day>
    <month>04</month>
    <year>2023</year>
   </pub-date>
   <pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2023-04-13T00:00:00+03:00">
    <day>13</day>
    <month>04</month>
    <year>2023</year>
   </pub-date>
   <issue>1</issue>
   <elocation-id>60-66</elocation-id>
   <history>
    <date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2023-03-27T00:00:00+03:00">
     <day>27</day>
     <month>03</month>
     <year>2023</year>
    </date>
    <date date-type="accepted" iso-8601-date="2023-04-13T00:00:00+03:00">
     <day>13</day>
     <month>04</month>
     <year>2023</year>
    </date>
   </history>
   <self-uri xlink:href="https://htlaw.ru/en/nauka/article/123946/view">https://htlaw.ru/en/nauka/article/123946/view</self-uri>
   <abstract xml:lang="ru">
    <p>Корпоративное управление рассмотрено как эффективная модель управления крупным бизнесом и некоммерческими предприятиями. Отмечено, что эффективность корпоративного управления базируется на механизме сдержек и противовесов и распределении полномочий и ответственности между агентами (менеджерами) и собственниками (акционерами, бенефициарами) компаний. Подчеркивается, что такая конфигурация помимо положительных эффектов порождает, в качестве неизбежного следствия особенностей системы менеджмента, агентскую проблему. Делается вывод, что, будучи потенциально фактически неизбежной, агентская проблема может быть предотвращена и нивелирована. Показано, что один из эффективных механизмов решения агентской проблемы — обеспечение транспарентности деятельности менеджмента компании.</p>
   </abstract>
   <trans-abstract xml:lang="en">
    <p>Corporate governance is considered as an effective management model for large businesses and non-profit enterprises. It is noted that the effectiveness of corporate governance is based on the mechanism of checks and balances and the distribution of powers and responsibilities between companies’ agents (managers) and owners (shareholders, beneficiaries). It is emphasized that such a configuration, in addition to positive effects, generates a principal-agent problem as an inevitable consequence of the features of the management system. It has been concluded that, being potentially virtually unavoidable, the principal-agent problem can be prevented and leveled. It is shown that one of the effective mechanisms for solving the principal-agent problem is to ensure transparency of the company’s management activities.</p>
   </trans-abstract>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="ru">
    <kwd>корпоративное управление</kwd>
    <kwd>бизнес</kwd>
    <kwd>менеджмент</kwd>
    <kwd>агентская теория</kwd>
    <kwd>агентская проблема</kwd>
    <kwd>конфликт интересов</kwd>
    <kwd>агент</kwd>
    <kwd>принципал</kwd>
    <kwd>акционер</kwd>
    <kwd>прибыль</kwd>
    <kwd>издержки</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="en">
    <kwd>corporate governance</kwd>
    <kwd>business</kwd>
    <kwd>management</kwd>
    <kwd>agent theory</kwd>
    <kwd>principal-agent problem</kwd>
    <kwd>conflict of interest</kwd>
    <kwd>agent</kwd>
    <kwd>principal</kwd>
    <kwd>shareholder</kwd>
    <kwd>profit</kwd>
    <kwd>costs</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
 <body>
  <p></p>
 </body>
 <back>
  <ref-list>
   <ref id="B1">
    <label>1.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Васильев М. В. Семейная фирма: современные взгляды американских исследователей // США и Канада: экономика, политика, культура. 2012. № 7 (511). С. 99—118. EDN: PBNUHN.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Vasiliev M. V. “Modern U.S. Viewpoints on Management of Family Firms”. SShA i Kanada: ekonomika, politika, kul’tura = USA &amp; Canada: Economics, Politics, Culture 7 (511) (2012): 99—118. (In Russian). EDN: PBNUHN.</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B2">
    <label>2.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Юрьева Л. В., Сухих В. С. Внутренний аудит и его взаимосвязь с системой внутреннего контроля организации: проблема идентификации и международный опыт // Вестник УрФУ. Серия: Экономика и управление. 2015. Т. 14. № 4. С. 622—641. DOI: 10.15826/vestnik.2015.14.4.036 EDN: ULZFJT.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Yuryeva Larisa V., Sukhikh Violetta S. “Internal Audit and its Relationship to the System of Internal Control: the Problem of Identification and International Experience”. Vestnik UrFU. Seriya: Ekonomika i upravleniye = Bulletin of Ural Federal University. Series Economics and Management 14.4 (2015): 622—641. (In Russian). https://doi.org/10.15826/vestnik.2015.14.4.036</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B3">
    <label>3.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Alhossini M. A., Ntim C. G., Zalata A. M. Corporate board committees and corporate outcomes: An international systematic literature review and agenda for future research // International Journal of Accounting. 2021. Vol. 56. No. 1. Art. ID: 2150001. DOI: 10.1142/S1094406021500013 EDN: EZBFHX.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Alhossini M. A., Ntim C. G., Zalata A. M. “Corporate Board Committees and Corporate Outcomes: An International Systematic Literature Review and Agenda for Future Research”. International Journal of Accounting 56.1 (2021): 2150001. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1094406021500013</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B4">
    <label>4.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Berle A. A. (Jr.), Means G. C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: McMillan, 1932. XIII, 396 p.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Berle A. A. (Jr.), Means G. C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Mc Millan, 1932. xiii, 396 p.</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B5">
    <label>5.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Do audit committees reduce the agency costs of ownership structure? / Ch. X. Cai, D. Hillier, G. Tian, Q. Wu // Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 2015. Vol. 35 (A). P. 225—240. DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.01.002.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Cai Ch. X., Hillier D., Tian G., Wu Q. “Do Audit Committees Reduce the Agency Costs of Ownership Structure?”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 35 (A) (2015): 225—240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.01.002</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B6">
    <label>6.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Eisenhardt K. M. Agency theory: an assessment and review // Academy of Management Review. 1989. Vol. 14. No. 1. P. 57—74. DOI: 10.2307/258191.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Eisenhardt Kathleen M. “Agency Theory: an Assessment and Review”. Academy of Management Review 14.1 (1989): 57—74. https://doi.org/10.2307/258191</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B7">
    <label>7.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Jensen M. C., Meckling W. H. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure // Journal of Financial Economics. 1976. Vol. 3. Iss. 4. P. 305—360. 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X. DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Jensen M. C., Meckling W. H. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. Journal of Financial Economics 3.4 (1976): 305—360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
   <ref id="B8">
    <label>8.</label>
    <citation-alternatives>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mostert I. Nose In, Fingers Out: Essays on Board-Governance Effectiveness: Ph.D. (Econ.) Dissertation. Groningen: Univ. of Groningen, 2020. 144 p. 10.33612/diss.132018621. DOI: 10.33612/diss.132018621.</mixed-citation>
     <mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mostert Irene. Nose In, Fingers Out: Essays on Board-Governance Effectiveness. Diss. Univ. of Groningen, SOM research school, 2020. Groningen: Univ. of Groningen, 2020. 144 p. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.132018621</mixed-citation>
    </citation-alternatives>
   </ref>
  </ref-list>
 </back>
</article>
