graduate student
Russian Federation
Corporate governance is considered as an effective management model for large businesses and non-profit enterprises. It is noted that the effectiveness of corporate governance is based on the mechanism of checks and balances and the distribution of powers and responsibilities between companies’ agents (managers) and owners (shareholders, beneficiaries). It is emphasized that such a configuration, in addition to positive effects, generates a principal-agent problem as an inevitable consequence of the features of the management system. It has been concluded that, being potentially virtually unavoidable, the principal-agent problem can be prevented and leveled. It is shown that one of the effective mechanisms for solving the principal-agent problem is to ensure transparency of the company’s management activities.
corporate governance, business, management, agent theory, principal-agent problem, conflict of interest, agent, principal, shareholder, profit, costs
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